Learning Hard Lessons from Columbia Decisions by Rogers, Ed
Learning Hard Lessons from Columbia Decisions
Ed Rogers, CKO
GSFC - NASA
“We are convinced that the 
management practices overseeing 
the Space Shuttle Program were as 
much a cause of the accident as the 
foam that struck the left wing.” 
CAIB Report, Vol. 1, p. 11
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180002845 2019-08-29T18:08:00+00:00Z
Why is this Important?
1. If you don’t understand  how you made a decision you 
have little chance of learning anything from it.
2. If you don’t learn much, you will probably think 
you’re more rational than you really are.
3. If you think you’re rational you 're making yourself 
more vulnerable to your own biases.
4. If you making biased  decisions you won’t understand  
why things don’t work—see number 1 above.
Columbia- The Organizational Culture
• Foam comes off the tank and strikes 
the orbiter during launch.
• Actual impact site is out of camera view 
so on-orbit imagery was needed to 
characterize the damage.
• NASA failed to hear dissenting opinions 
and views and it did not seem plausible 
that foam could damage the wing.
• Management concluded there was 
nothing that could be done anyway.
COLUMBIA
Accident Investigation Board
“In our view, the NASA 
organizational culture had as 
much to do with this accident 
as the foam.” 
CAIB Report, Vol. 1, p. 97

The Expert Opinion
❖ Thermal Protection Expert 
❖ Gave an ‘early opinion’
❖ Had access to MMT
❖ Delivered  the message Mgmt wanted  to hear
❖ Set a new thresh-hold  for other viewpoints
❖ DAT couldn’t even get approval to get  data
Making Use of Experts
❖ Misuse of Experts as “Tool of Convenience”
❖ Can pick and  choose experts to get ‘correct answer’
❖ Introduces hidden decision making risks:
❖ Wrong expertise being applied
❖ Human factors (wanting to please)
❖ Anchoring of decision maker opinions 
❖ Ignores or downplays further information
❖ Looks for ways to justify desired  opinion
❖ NASA Management leaned  on an expert opinion early
❖ Undermined  the perceived  authority of the DAT
Decision Making Using Data
❖ If your conclusion would  be the same either way then
❖ You aren’t really making a data driven decision
❖ You may have simply confirmed your biases
❖ You are most likely worse off (decision wise)
❖ Better to not have data than to have bad  data
❖ Very DIFFICULT to RESIST this TEMPTATION
The CRATER Model
P   Penetration depth (Dependent variable)
L   Length of foam projectile
d    Diameter of foam projectile
p f Density of foam
V  Foam velocity (right angle component)
V* Velocity required  to break through tile coating
s   Compressive strength of tile
p t Density of tile
0.0195  Empirical constant
0.0195 ( L / d ) 0.45 (d ) ( pf ) 0.27 ( V - V* 
) 2/3
P  =      
( St ) ¼  ( pt ) 1/6
Why Use an Invalid Model?
❖ Empirical data based  model
❖ For small pieces of foam striking tile
❖ Foam block was 400-640 times larger
❖ Didn’t know where it hit (was really a TILE model)
❖ Extreme extrapolation of model
❖ Invalid  application (correctly d ismissed)
❖ Should  have confirmed ‘UNCERTAINTY’
Believing What You Want to Be 
True
❖ Foam Can’t Hurt the RCC  (intuitive engineering)
❖ There isn’t much we can do about it.
❖ Accept a lousy rationale
❖ Haven’t had  any safety of flight issues in 112 flights
❖ Haven’t changed  anything so…
❖ Risk is the same so…
❖ ET is safe to fly with no added  risk.

Lessons in Decision Making
❖ Dealing with ambiguous information requires a careful 
approach to decision making. 
❖ Know (choose consciously) HOW you should  make the 
decision and  then follow through:
❖ Gut instinct (time is of the essence or routine)
❖ Experience based  (similar to previous experience)
❖ Conduct study/ test since data is d ifferent/ new
❖ Ask an expert (similar but unfamiliar)
Tough Words to Say
“I don’t know.”
The Take Away
❖ Understand  how you have made decisions
❖ Learn from the decisions you have made
❖ Be in control of your decision making processes
